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Abstract
What is the effect of politicization on EU representation? We empirically test two competing views
through a focus on party–voter congruence, namely whether parties share the policy preferences of
their voters. The first perspective expects that the process of politicization – either through party or
media contestation – would improve party–voter agreement. The second perspective argues that
politicization has not improved the supply of partisan debate with parties still not offering satisfac-
tory options to voters who are primarily driven by protest‐based considerations; and as such does
not expect an effect. We analyse congruence on the left–right and pro–anti‐EU dimensions,
capturing questions related to EU policy and polity, respectively. Our examination of four
European Parliament elections (1999–2014) and 341 parties across 53 electoral contexts points
to the limited effect of politicization upon representation. Our findings have significant implica-
tions for the study of EU politicization and representation and open up avenues for future research.
Keywords: representation; politicization; political parties; voters; congruence; EU elections
Introduction
Politicization is a key development in European Union (EU) politics (De Wilde
et al., 2016). The literature on its consequences has focused on the structure of political
conflict in Europe and the process of European integration (for example Hooghe and
Marks, 2009, 2018; Hutter et al., 2016). While some posit that politicization contributes
to a lasting transformation of the structural basis of European integration (De Wilde
and Zürn, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009), others argue that it has not been able to
systematically restructure political conflict (for example Börzel and Risse, 2009; Hutter
et al., 2016). This article contributes to this debate through an analysis of the effect of
EU politicization on representation in the European Parliament (EP), which forms the
direct channel of representation within the EU’s constitutional framework. We ask: if
there is some change – permanent or otherwise – in the nature and scope of politicization
in Europe, to what extent is this also reflected in the patterns of political representation in
the EU polity?
We empirically test two competing views on the potential effect of politicization on
representation. On the one hand, primarily normative‐oriented research has considered
politicization to be a key force behind the legitimacy of the European project (for example
Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Schmitter, 1969; Statham and Trenz, 2015). The process of
politicization – either through party or media contestation – would entail parties taking
*
Both authors have equally contributed to this article. The sequence of names represents the principle of rotation.
JCMS pp. 1–18 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13125
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons
Ltd.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
alternative positions on the EU policy and polity dimensions; voters updating their policy
preferences and opting for parties that are close(r) to them; thus, resulting in better party–
voter agreement. On the other hand, empirically‐oriented scholars have shown that
politicizationv has not created a coherent political environment (for example De Wilde
et al., 2016; Hutter et al., 2016). Politicization has not improved the supply of partisan
debate, and EP elections are primarily driven by protest‐based considerations, which
suggests that politicization has no effect on party–voter agreement.
Our contribution is threefold. First, this article takes a pioneering step at examining
the consequences of politicization for the process of European integration through the
prism of representation. Understanding whether politicization has an effect on the link-
age between political parties and voters is a ‘missing piece’ in the literature given that
they are key actors and drivers of political contestation. Second, empirically, we focus
on party–voter ideological congruence, namely the extent to which parties share the
preferences of their voters during EP elections on the left–right and pro‐anti EU dimen-
sions. The left–right dimension involves policies that are made through the EU in the
Council and the EP (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Braun et al., 2016; Hertner, 2015, p.
471). The pro‐anti EU dimension captures debates related to the constitutional frame-
work and institutional structures of the EU and thus concerns questions about the EU
polity (Norris, 1997, pp. 277–278). We examine congruence in four EP electoral con-
tests (1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014). These elections cover a time point prior to the EU’s
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and each election prior to, during and after
the Eurozone crisis. We focus on the EU‐15 as Western European party systems tend to
be more stable and institutionalized compared to their Central and Eastern European
counterparts. We analyse congruence on both the left–right and pro–anti‐EU
dimensions for a total of 341 parties, by employing a sophisticated measure of relative
congruence (Golder and Stramski, 2010). This allows us to provide a comprehensive
picture of representation in the EP on both dimensions across political contexts and
over time. Third, our findings point to the limited effect of politicization upon represen-
tation in the EP and thereby support the second, more sceptical, perspective. This find-
ing is important because it serves to qualify the academic debate over the consequences
of politicization for European integration. From the lens of representative politics,
politicization has neither a positive nor a negative effect on the integration process.
This informs claims made by scholars taking a competitive elitism perspective
(Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Hix, 2006) and Habermasians (Statham and Trenz, 2013,
2015; Trenz and Eder, 2004) who view politicization as a positive precondition for
further integration. It also qualifies the post‐functionalist approach (Hooghe and
Marks, 2009) that views politicization as potentially aggravating the problems of
European integration (see also Hutter et al., 2016 for a discussion).
I. Politicization and EU Representation
Politicization is a multidimensional concept that refers to the expanded role of political
conflict in a political system (Hutter and Grande, 2014, p. 1003). In the EU, politicization
tends to be considered a consequence of authority being transferred from the domestic to
the EU level (De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Concretely, politici-
zation relates to the extent to which decisions at the EU level are publicly contested and
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debated; and consists of three key dimensions, including issue salience, actor expansion
and polarization (for example De Wilde et al., 2016; Hutter et al., 2016). Issue
salience hinges upon the visibility of a given issue in public debates. Expansion of
actorsv draws attention to the number of actors involved in the conflict with politici-
zation being low if only a limited number of actors engage with the issue. Finally,
polarization refers to the intensity of conflict over the given issue. For polarization
to occur, actors need to advance opposing stances and offer different solutions to the
issue (Grande and Hutter, 2016; Hutter and Kriesi, 2019). Empirically, EU politiciza-
tion has been studied in the national political arena (Hutter and Grande, 2014; Kriesi,
2016, p. 32) and also during EP elections (Meijers and Rauh, 2016), not least because
literature suggests that there are spill‐over effects of EU politicization from the national
to EP electoral arenas (Ares et al., 2017). In this article, we focus on EP elections
which provide an appropriate context because they are organized at the national level
with domestic parties competing for seats in the EP and are known for their
second‐order character (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).
Prior research on EU representation suggests that party–voter agreement on the left–
right dimension and related policies has been relatively high (for example Mattila and
Raunio, 2006; Vasilopoulou and Gattermann, 2013). Congruence on the EU dimension
was also a key empirical finding in the 1980s and 1990s, which was attributed to the
low salience of the EU issue (for example Schmitt and Thomassen, 2000; van der Eijk
and Franklin, 1991). Mattila and Raunio (2006, 2012) questioned this proximity in the
2000s, showing that in 2004 parties were closer to their voters on the left–right dimension
compared to the EU dimension, and that in 2009 voters and parties were drifting further
apart on the EU dimension. Dolný and Baboš (2015), however, found that in 2009
congruence on the EU dimension was higher than on the left–right dimension. Taken
together, although these works offer important insights into the study of EU representa-
tion, they do not provide a systematic analysis of EU representation. They examine
party–voter congruence at one point in time; mostly focus on one dimension (either
left–right or EU); and employ different operationalizations of representation, which
hinders the comparability of their findings. In this article, we provide a thorough account
of representation in the EP on the pro‐anti and left–right dimensions across countries and
over time.
To what extent does politicization have an impact on congruence? Our aim here is to
unpack the key propositions from two leading perspectives in the literature on the poten-
tial consequences of politicization on representation. The first approach has its roots in
early neo‐functionalist thinkers of European integration (Haas, 2004; Schmitter, 1969).
Schmitter (1969, p. 166, italics in the original) puts forward a politicization hypothesis
whereby the ‘controversiality of joint decision‐making goes up’, which in turn ‘is likely
to lead to a widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration’. This
conflict would result in a ‘redefinition of mutual objectives’ and ultimately there would be
a ‘shift in actor expectations and loyalty toward the new regional center’. These authors
did not directly address the issue of representation; but essentially suggested that
contestation about the EU would lead to higher support for integration, serving to legiti-
mize the EU project. Drawing from this perspective, more recent scholarship suggests that
EU politicization can address some of the weaknesses of the system (for example
Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Statham and Trenz, 2015).
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Based on the competitive model of representative democracy (Schumpeter, 1943),
Føllesdal and Hix (2006) foresaw the following mechanism: contestation fosters political
debate and deliberation. Democratic arenas for contestation where issues are deliberated
provide incentives to parties to develop and promote alternative and competing policy
packages, which – in turn – becomes a vehicle for public opinion formation. In this
context, voters would have the opportunity to choose between rival candidates and rival
policy agendas. The logical sequence of this argument is that given the variety of policy
options on offer, voters would be able to opt for parties that are close(r) to their
preferences. Hence politicization would improve representation. In their words, contesta-
tion would lead to ‘a greater connection between voters’ preferences and coalitions and
alignments in the EU institutions’ (Føllesdal and Hix, 2006, p. 553). This logic underpins
the authors’ support of open competition for the (s)election of the Commission President.
This process would contribute to ‘contestation about politics in, not only of, the EU’
(Føllesdal and Hix, 2006, p. 554, italics in original). It would promote citizens’
policy‐learning and information, which would allow Europeans to better formulate their
preferences on specific issues (Hix, 2006).
From a Habermasian public sphere perspective, politicization is also assumed to
improve decision‐making and democratic performance. Democratic functionalism, in par-
ticular, suggests that mass‐mediated public debates and Europeanized public spheres are
essential because they create an iterative process of learning, which enables citizens to up-
date their preferences and make informed decisions. This is where the public gains access
to information about party stances and executive decisions. The presence of a public
shapes the behaviour of political actors who ‘mobilise their demands with the aim of
gaining public support for their stances’ (Statham and Trenz, 2013, p. 969). In other
words, media contestation over Europe is associated with better‐informed citizens who
can make better choices. At the same time, the presence of a public provides feedback
to political actors who make their positions more transparent (for example Statham and
Trenz, 2015; Trenz and Eder, 2004). In short, mediated politicization allows for greater
interaction between politicians and the public, which is likely to improve representation.
Taken together, these primarily normative‐oriented perspectives would expect that the
process of politicization – either through party or media contestation – would lead to
parties taking alternative positions on the EU policy and polity dimensions; voters
updating their policy preferences and opting for parties that are close(r) to them. This
suggests that politicization results in better party–voter agreement (H1).
The second approach derives from empirically‐oriented literature and offers a differen-
tiated view on the potential impact of politicization on EU representation. For politiciza-
tion to result in higher levels of representation, two processes need to be taking place:
clarity and affect. Clarity relates to citizens becoming aware of this politicization and
affect means that they care about it, and thus react to it in their behaviour.
A number of empirical accounts cast doubt on the question of clarity. First, there is a
debate in the literature with regard to the level and intensity of politicization. Whereas
some scholars argue that ‘the giant is still sleeping’ (Green‐Pedersen, 2012; van der Eijk
and Franklin, 2004), others posit that since Maastricht European integration has entered a
new phase of controversial ‘mass politics’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). More recently,
empirical research has shown that politicization is a punctuated and differentiated process,
which exhibits strong variation across time and space (De Wilde et al., 2016; Hutter and
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Kriesi, 2019). In this context, politicization is considered as a ‘set of strategic options for
political actors’ (Grande and Kriesi, 2016, p. 291), which implies that parties may not
consistently put forward rival policy agendas, and as such collective learning processes
may not necessarily be enduring. Second, and related, politicization increases uncertainty
for mainstream political elites. Their lengthy participation in government suggests that
they have been heavily involved in the making of the EU polity (see Hooghe and
Marks, 2009, p. 21). If they shifted their EU position, they would risk undermining their
own trustworthiness thereby enhancing the credibility of their competitors (Rohrschneider
and Whitefield, 2016). Empirical evidence indeed shows that mainstream parties tend to
stick to their programmatic positions notwithstanding positional shifts among voters
(Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Fraught by internal dissent, they generally tend to downplay
European issues, which undermines clarity (Braun et al., 2016; Mattila and Raunio, 2012,
p. 590). Along these lines, Meijers and Rauh (2016, p. 83) find that increased politiciza-
tion in EP elections has not been associated with ‘enhanced and more interactive supply
of partisan debate about Europe’. Although mainstream government parties pay some
attention to the EU issue in national parliamentary debates (Rauh and De Wilde, 2018),
they have limited incentives to electorally politicize the EU (Green‐Pedersen, 2012)
and opt instead for de‐politicization and technocratic solutions to avoid contestation
(Grande and Kriesi, 2016, p. 290).
In terms of affect, there is also no clear indication that the public responds to politiciza-
tion. The first issue here is the quality of information supply, namely the type of informa-
tion available that allows citizens to form their preferences. Coverage about the EU’s
involvement in policy‐making tends to be superficial (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, p. 143).
We also know that MEP visibility in domestic media depends more on ‘who these MEPs
are’ in terms of office, seniority and status and less on ‘what they do in the EP’ in terms
of legislative activity (Gattermann and Vasilopoulou, 2015), which does not contribute
to citizens’ better understanding of EU politics. Second, we know that citizens increasingly
assign responsibility to the EU for policy outcomes; while at the same time being aware of
its weak accountability structures (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Citizens cannot directly hold
EU executive politicians to account. Some citizens respond to this limited political choice
by defecting frommainstream to challenger parties, especially if they are more Eurosceptic
than the mainstream parties (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). This could be partly driven by
ideology; however, literature also shows that protest‐based considerations regarding
government approval are crucial to explaining vote‐switching in EP elections, which
undermines the scope for improved representation (Magalhaes, 2016). In fact, EP elections
remain second‐order. Although the salience of the elections in the media has increased,
citizens have not become more engaged and knowledgeable about the EU and thus are
not better at judging what parties are offering (van der Brug and de Vreese, 2016).
Likewise, the EP’s lead candidate (Spitzenkandidaten) initiative has not substantively
altered the second‐order nature of EP elections (for example Gattermann et al., 2016).
This discussion points to the following mechanism: sporadic, punctuated and differen-
tiated politicization does not necessarily create a stable and coherent political environ-
ment that would lead to better party–voter agreement. Politicization has not improved
the supply of partisan debate, voters are not necessarily better informed, and EP elections
are primarily driven by protest‐based considerations. This suggests that politicization has
no effect on party–voter agreement (H2).
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II. Data and Methods
To evaluate the theoretical framework presented above, we designed a new dataset in
which our unit of analysis – party–voter congruence – is nested in political contexts,
which vary across time and space, namely four EP elections in 15 EU member states.
There are two important considerations, namely comparability and coherence in the
observations, which we accounted for in our approach. To address the first issue, we
operationalize our main dependent and independent variables with relative measures at
the party system‐election level. Given that the interpretation of the left–right and pro‐anti
EU dimensions may differ between elections and countries, relative measures allow us to
compare patterns of congruence and politicization across political contexts. To address
the second issue, the calculations of our main variables are based on a single data source,
namely the post‐election voter surveys of the European Election Studies (EES) of the
years 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 for the EU‐15 member states (Popa and Schmitt, 2015;
Schmitt et al., 2009, 2015a, 2015b; van der Eijk et al., 1999; van Egmond et al., 2013).
One advantage of this approach is that – since we rely on voters’ placement for party
positions as we explain below – we avoid missing values for those parties which are
not included in other data sources, such as expert surveys or manifesto data.
Dependent Variables and Model
EES data allow us to identify the political parties individual voters had voted for, the
individual self‐placement of these voters on the left–right dimension and their attitudes
towards European unification, as well as the placement by the respondents of all parties
on the same scales. We calculate our dependent variables as relative voter congruence
(RVC) on the left–right and pro–anti‐EU dimensions. This measure is based on Golder
and Stramski’s (2010, p. 96) relative citizen congruence, which is operationalized as
‘many‐to‐one’ relationship. Contrary to a simple mean difference between party and voter
positions, RVC considers the distance between the ideological position of the individual
voter and her party, in relation to the dispersion of the preferences of all voters having
supported the same party. It is thus suitable to compare levels of congruence across
various country contexts at different points in time:
RVC ¼ 1 














where Vij is the ideal point of the ith voter of party j, and MVj is the ideological position
of the median voter position of all voters (N) of party j. Pj is the party’s ideological
position, which we calculated by taking the means of party evaluations per country and
election year. All respondents were asked to evaluate all parties regardless of their party
political preferences.1 However, we consider only the 40 per cent most educated respon-
dents across the whole political spectrum as opposed to the entire electorate to ensure the
1
Note that, by considering the assessment of all respondents, we extend Mattila and Raunio’s (2012, p. 595) approach who
compare ‘voters’ own policy positions with their assessment of the position of the party they voted for’.
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validity and reliability of our dependent variable. This is because less educated respon-
dents are more inclined to opt for the middle position on an evaluation scale rather than
admitting to not knowing the answer if this is the case (see also Alvarez and Nagler, 2004,
p. 50; Golder and Stramski, 2010, p. 98). This tends to result in more centrist evaluations
of the mean placement of each party. Mean comparisons between the two different
operationalizations indeed show significant differences, with the measures based on all
voters’ party evaluations being closer to the mean position of the standardized scales
(Table A4). As a robustness check, we calculated a second measure of our dependent
variables based on all voters’ party evaluations.2 We report the respective models in
Online Appendix D. In these models, we also calculated those independent variables,
which take party positions into account (see below) based on all voters’ party evaluations.
The results are similar to those that we report below; any differences are reported in the
footnotes.
While we acknowledge that there are many ways to measure party positions, including
expert surveys and party elite surveys (for example Belchior, 2013; Rohrschneider and
Whitefield, 2016; Schmitt and Thomassen, 2000), we agree with Dalton and
McAllister (2015, p. 767) who argue that ‘the public’s perceptions of the parties create
the basis of their voting choices – even if these perceptions are imperfect’, which is
important for our argument that relates to congruence (see also Mattila and Raunio, 2006,
2012; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1991). This would be different if we studied responsive-
ness among parties and voters as the latter do not necessarily adapt their evaluations of
party positions when these change (for example Adams et al., 2011). An additional ad-
vantage of calculating the mean party position in this way is that voters use the same scale
as for their self‐placements and at the same point in time (Golder and Stramski, 2010,
p. 99). This would be different had we relied on expert surveys or party manifestos.
We have two measures for RVC; one for the left–right dimension (RVCLR), and a
second for the pro‐anti EU dimension (RVCEU). Our unit of analysis is ideological
congruence per party in each country and each election for the EU‐15 member states
(N = 341). Both variables range from 0 to 1 (RVCLR: M = 0.09; SD = 0.11; RVCEU:
M = 0.10; SD = 0.10). 0 stands for perfect ideological congruence between voters and
the party they voted for. Higher values indicate that their ideological positions are further
apart from each other. As the low means and the standard deviations of our dependent
variable suggest, the distributions are skewed right. A linear regression model is not
appropriate as it may ‘yield fitted values for the variable of interest that exceed its lower
and upper bounds’ (Ferrari and Cribari‐Neto, 2004, p. 799). We thus choose a beta regres-
sion model, which is suitable for the structure of our dependent variable (0< y< 1) and
can also accommodate skewed distributions.3 Our data do not have a precise panel
structure. The number of cases increases with each election year, ranging from 80 parties
in 1999, over 79 in 2004 and 84 in 2009, to 98 parties in 2014 covering a total of 53 party
systems in all election years (see Table A1). Given this variation, we cluster our robust
standard errors by election year and party systems.
2
T‐tests reveal no differences between the two operationalizations on the pro–anti‐EU dimension. However, our variable on
the left–right dimension is significantly smaller (Mdifference = 0.01, p < 0.001) compared to the measure based on all voters
(Table A5).
3
In accordance to the model specification, we have transformed 0 values to 0.000001.
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Furthermore, we are unable to include the same parties and countries consecutively
each year (for an overview see Tables A2 and A3). This relates, firstly, to the calculation
of our dependent variables. Some of the original variables concerning self‐placements,
party placements and education have missing values. Our data thus excludes the entire
samples of Belgium and Sweden in 2004. Secondly, our case selection is also determined
by one major independent variable reported below, namely party polarization. Since this
variable accounts for party positions of all coded parties in a given party system/year, we
require as much information as possible on these other party positions. However, our
dataset includes only few parties for some election contexts. We therefore decided to only
include party systems per election if the coded parties together make up at least 80 per
cent of the total vote share. This has led to the exclusion of seven additional party
systems/years (see Table A3). Thirdly, in some countries electoral coalitions have
changed over time, such as in Italy, or they have not been treated consistently as coalitions
or individual parties in different EES waves, such as in Germany or the Netherlands. In
these cases, we have values for their various coalitions or for individual parties at different
points in time. Lastly, we only consider parties for which there were at least ten respon-
dents in the EES. Despite the missing values, our data consist of a comparable number
of parties and party systems for each election year (see Table A1).
Independent Variables
Our measures of politicization are directly linked to the definition of De Wilde
et al. (2016, p. 4) that focuses on three dimensions, namely polarization of opinion –
which according to the authors is often operationalized as polarization at the party system
level (De Wilde et al., 2016, p. 7), salience and the expansion of actors and audiences.
Likewise, Hutter and Grande (2014, p. 1003) conceptualize politicization as being
manifest in increased actor polarization, rising issue salience and expansion to
non‐governmental actors. We operationalize politicization as follows: first, we consider
all three components separately and measure (actor) polarization by party system
dispersion; salience by media visibility; and actor expansion as focus on EU‐level actors
in news coverage. We do this to examine whether any of these variables has a distinct
effect that may drive the effect of the composite measures (see below).
Party polarization uses the measure of weighted party system dispersion by Schuck










where VSjk is the vote share and Pjk is the position of party j in country k either on the EU
dimension, andPk is the weighted mean of all party positions in country k. The vote share
is based on first preference votes in the case of Ireland. Since the placement scales slightly
differed in each EES we standardized the party positions for all election years to compare
party positions over time. As with the dependent variables, we have two measures for
WPSD, one that measures the extent to which the left–right dimension is contested by
political parties in the domestic context (Party polarizationLR, M = 0.23; SD = 0.05),
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and a second that measures polarization on the pro‐anti EU dimension (Party
polarizationEU, M = 0.18; SD = 0.08).
4
To measure salience and expansion of actors to non‐domestic and nongovernmental
actors, respectively, we include two variables from De Vreese and Azrout (2019) who
conducted quantitative content analyses of newspapers during the three weeks leading
up to Election Day in each country. EU visibility (M = 0.09; SD = 0.06) is the ‘proportion
of articles [on the front page] that mention the EU, or one of its institutions, at least once’
(De Vreese and Azrout, 2019, p. 8). Europeanness of EU news (M = 0.32; SD = 0.20; n =
328) measures ‘the proportion of articles that have an EU actor as main actor’ on front
pages (De Vreese and Azrout, 2019, p. 8). The latter variable has missing values for
Belgium and Luxembourg in 1999.
A second way of operationalizing politicization is to relate the three different
components to one another. On their own, the indicators may not explain much. Rather,
polarization may have an effect when EU issues are salient and/or EU actors become
visible. We rely on Hutter et al. (2016) and calculate politicization by (a) multiplying
salience with the sum of actor expansion and party polarization, and – following Hutter
and Kriesi (2019, p. 1005) who amended their own measure of politicization – by (b)
multiplying salience with party polarization only. Considering these two alternative
measures provided by the extant literature allows us to address possible spurious effects
derived from the operationalization of politicization. In other words, it adds validity to
our findings. As before, we have two composite measures for each politicization
variable: PoliticizationALR (M = 0.06;SD = 0.04) and PoliticizationAEU (M = 0.05;SD =
0.04) for the first measure and PoliticizationBLR (M = 0.02;SD = 0.02) and
PoliticizationBEU (M = 0.02;SD = 0.01) for the second one. We estimate the respective
models separately.
Table A6 compares the mean values of these system‐level variables over time. While
there are no considerable and linear differences with respect to party polarization, the
mean EU visibility scores are significantly higher in 2014 compared to the previous
years, and the effect is rather sizable with η2 = 0.484. Similarly, the Europeanness of
news is highest in 1999 and lowest in 2004, after which mean scores are slightly
increasing (η2 = 0.264).
Controls
Politicization is a strategic opportunity for EU issue entrepreneurs (De Vries and
Hobolt, 2012). We created a dichotomous variable which differentiates between
challenger parties (0) that have not been in government and mainstream parties (1)
that have (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Most of our parties are mainstream parties
(60.7%) (Table A7). Drawing upon the literature on party–voter congruence (for
example Belchior, 2013; Mattila and Raunio, 2006, 2012), we also add the following
party‐level variables: Vote share is operationalized by the party’s vote share (or that
of an electoral coalition) in the respective EP election in a given country. We
expect smaller parties to be more representative as they tend to be more ideologically
homogenous (Mattila and Raunio, 2006). Party age is calculated from the year of
4
We also calculated the unweighted party system dispersion, which ignores the vote share of each party. The results are sim-
ilar to those reported below (see Online Appendix D).
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establishment of the party. Congruence between voters and older parties is likely to be
better compared to newly established parties because voters are able to rely on
historical information when assessing party positions in order to decide which party
to vote for.
At the system level we have to be parsimonious given the relatively small N. We
calculated the effective number of parties measured by the number of seats they received
in the EP following the respective election on the basis of Gallagher’s (2015) index. Party
system fragmentation is likely to result in higher voter–party congruence. Furthermore,
we account for variation in turnout over time and across country. Lastly, as politicization
patterns might differ across regions, we include a dummy for North Western Europe,
which is 0 for the remaining South European countries plus Ireland (Hutter and
Kriesi, 2019). Table A7 includes all descriptive statistics.
III. Results
Mean comparisons indicate that aggregate levels of party–voter congruence on both
dimensions range between 0.078 and 0.113 (Table A8). Higher values indicate less
congruence; and RVCLR does not exceed 0.1 (1999) and has lowest values in 2009
(0.078); RVCEU is highest in 1999 (0.113) and lowest in 2014 (0.082). It is difficult
to assess the extent to which these levels of congruence can be considered satisfactory,
as the literature does not provide any thresholds that would indicate whether congruence
is sufficient or even good. Golder and Stramski (2010, p. 101) analysed data from 36
countries between 1996 and 2005 from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
project. They found higher values for relative congruence between governments and
Figure 1: Average marginal effects on levels of congruence on the left–right dimension (Model 1)
and the pro–anti‐EU dimension (Model 2), N = 328. Note: Dots represent average marginal effects
and lines 95% confidence intervals. Positive effects denote decreasing levels of congruence.
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citizens, that is the same measure that we applied for party–voter congruence, in both
proportional (M = 0.17, SD = 0.13) and majoritarian systems (M = 0.17, SD = 0.14). In
other words, our results indicate that EP parties and their voters are comparatively closer
on both the left–right and EU dimensions.
To investigate these patterns we turn to our explanatory analysis. The results from the
beta regressions are reported in the following figures. Figure 1 contains the average
marginal effects on congruence on the left–right dimension (Model 1) and congruence
on the pro‐anti EU dimension (Model 2). They include the individual measures of
politicization, namely party polarization, EU visibility and Europeanness of news. The
subsequent figures visualise similar models, but include the composite politicization
measures A and B that account for all three components (Figure 2) or only salience and
polarization (Figure 3), respectively.
Figure 1 shows that party polarization over left–right or EU issues does not have
any effects on congruence on either dimension. Actor expansion, which we operation-
alized as Europeanness of news, does not seem to matter either for better or worse
levels of congruence – be that over policy issues or matters related to the polity.
Likewise, the salience of EU issues (EU visibility) has no effect on party–voter
congruence on either dimension. There are no differences between mainstream and
challenger parties. Moreover, as Figure 2 demonstrates, politicization – if measured
by multiplying salience with the sum of actor expansion and party polarization (Hutter
et al., 2016) – does not have any effect on party–voter congruence on either
dimension. Likewise, our second operationalization of politicization which multiplies
salience with party polarization (Hutter and Kriesi, 2019) also has no effect (Figure 3).
The control variables do not often reach conventional levels of significance. However,
Figure 2: Average marginal effects on levels of congruence on the left–right dimension (Model 3)
and the pro–anti‐EU dimension (Model 4), n = 328. Note: Dots represent average marginal effects
and lines 95% confidence intervals. Positive effects denote decreasing levels of congruence.
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the effects of party age, turnout and effective number of parties point to the expected
direction.
Conclusion
In this article, we sought to uncover the relationship between politicization and represen-
tation through an empirical analysis of party–voter agreement in four EP elections (1999,
2004, 2009 and 2014) in the EU‐15 member states. We tested two opposing views on this
relationship. The first perspective expects that the process of politicization – either
through party or media contestation – would improve party–voter agreement (H1). The
second perspective, on the other hand, does not expect an effect (H2). Our findings are
in line with the second hypothesis. This has implications for the study of EU politiciza-
tion. It points to the potential limitations of approaches that view politicization as a
positive precondition for further integration (for example Føllesdal and Hix, 2006;
Hix, 2006; Statham and Trenz, 2013, 2015). It also informs the perspective that considers
politicization as potentially aggravating the problems of European integration (Hooghe
and Marks, 2009).
Parties have been slow at adjusting to the politicization of EU affairs and have not been
successful at communicating this to their voters. If anything, the sorting of parties and
voters into like‐minded alliances is transitory and very likely to change. Maier
et al. (2019) show that the media – rather than parties – set the agenda on EU‐related
issues even during campaigns, and that there is no linear relationship between an EU
issue’s media visibility and the extent to which political parties react to it. It is
conceivable that parties require more time to adjust to new political realities in order to
be able to communicate this to their voters, who in turn would need to update their
Figure 3: Average marginal effects on levels of congruence on the left–right dimension (Model 5)
and the pro–anti‐EU dimension (Model 6), n = 341. Note: Dots represent average marginal effects
and lines 95% confidence intervals. Positive effects denote decreasing levels of congruence.
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preferences and re‐align. Scholarship should thus examine the effect of EU politicization
on representation in future EP elections. While we agree that mainstream parties are
programmatically inflexible (Hooghe and Marks, 2018) – and our findings support this
to a large extent – our results also demonstrate that challenger parties are not closer to
their voters compared to mainstream parties. Although both sanctioning and ideological
selection processes matter when casting a vote for challenger parties (Hobolt and
Tilley, 2016), our findings on congruence in contexts of politicization also lend support
to theories of protest voting, and more broadly to the second‐order EP elections model
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980). This suggests that the new transnational cleavage (Hooghe
and Marks, 2018), which has been in the making during the last decades, is shaped by
both ideological and protest‐based considerations.
We are confident about our results for a number of reasons. First, and regarding our
measure of the dependent variable, the aggregate analysis suggests that levels of congru-
ence are relatively high ranging between 0.078 and 0.113. Werner, (2020, p. 133) demon-
strates that one needs to be cautious when interpreting levels of relative congruence as the
distribution tends to be slightly biased towards lower values, namely better congruence.
According to Werner (2020) this would also partially explain why the literature finds rel-
atively high levels of congruence between representatives and represented (for example
Belchior, 2013; Mattila and Raunio, 2006, 2012; Vasilopoulou and Gattermann, 2013).
Nonetheless, we are able to compare our results to existing studies that rely on the same
measure. Our values are slightly lower (namely better) than congruence between citizens
and governments in the 36 countries studied by Golder and Stramski (2010, p. 101)
between 1996 and 2005. This resonates with Dalton (2017, p. 618) who argues that at
the aggregate level ‐whether partisans as a collective are close to their chosen parties’
positions‐ little has changed over time in EP elections. He finds that ‘the basic pattern
is that like‐minded voters and parties are able to connect, which is an essential aspect
of democratic representation’.
Second, high levels of congruence entail limited variation to be explained by party and
party‐system level theoretical propositions. Nonetheless, our measures of politicization
are in line with the literature. We relied on the conceptual definitions of politicization
provided by De Wilde et al. (2016, p. 3) and Hutter and Grande (2014, p. 1003) and ap-
plied two operationalizations of the composite measures (Hutter et al., 2016; Hutter and
Kriesi, 2019) alongside the individual items. While the latter authors also measure
salience and actor expansion by a content analysis of European news outlets, their precise
operationalization differs from De Vreese and Azrout (2019). We opted for De Vreese and
Azrout (2019) given that their coherent and comprehensive database covers the EU‐15
member states in the 1999 to 2014 EU elections. Our measure of polarization (Alvarez
and Nagler, 2004) is well‐established and has previously been applied in the context of
EU studies (for example Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015; Schuck et al., 2011). Similar
to existing scholarship (De Wilde et al., 2016; Hutter and Kriesi, 2019; Hutter
et al., 2016), our measures of politicization do not increase linearly over time, but are
context‐dependent, which supports the reliability of our measures and the validity of
our inferences. Third, we have tested the relationship between politicization and
representation over four EP elections. Hence the results are not driven by debate
specificities during a given EP election.
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Our aim was to provide a first, yet thorough, account of the relationship between EU
politicization and representation. We recommend the following steps to further investigate
this relationship. First, our analysis distinguished between challenger and mainstream
parties to account for potential strategic behaviour of political parties (for example De
Vries and Hobolt, 2012). However, Eurosceptic (challenger) parties are considered the
main driver of politicization of EU affairs (for example Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Fur-
thermore, traditional ideologies along the left–right spectrum may also explain varying
levels of congruence across different types of political parties (for example Costello
et al., 2012; Lefkofridi and Casado‐Asensio, 2013; McEvoy, 2012). We thus recommend
that, theoretically, future research takes ideological party positions into account to assess
the extent to which these moderate the effects of politicization on representation. Such a
distinction between different party types would also allow researchers to study the extent
to which party responsiveness is affected by either growing or varying levels of EU polit-
icization. Although research has started addressing questions pertaining to the effect of
politicization on the relationship between parties (for example Maier et al., 2019; Meijers
and Rauh, 2016), we know little about the potential effect of EU politicization on party
responsiveness to voters. Mainstream parties deserve particular attention since they tend
to either ignore (for example Hooghe and Marks, 2009, 2018) or downplay politicization
of EU affairs (for example Braun et al., 2016; Grande and Kriesi, 2016). Here, research
could also examine the extent to which EU politicization has an effect on voter percep-
tions of political parties (see Adams et al., 2011).
Second, we examined representation through the prism of party–voter congruence.
Our unit of analysis is at the party level and follows extant literature that focuses on
how well representatives are performing in representing their voters (for example Mattila
and Raunio, 2006, 2012). Future research could further empirically disaggregate the
relationship between EU politicization and representation by studying data at the level
of individual voters (for example Dalton, 2017; McEvoy, 2012). Such an analysis would
also allow for a precise individual‐level test of clarity and affect, by for example examin-
ing the extent to which information gains through individual exposure to politicization
influence voters’ receptiveness to party cues. It could also assess whether EU issue
salience at the individual level corresponds to EU issue salience at the party level.
Third, we studied congruence on the left–right and pro‐anti EU dimensions. These re-
spectively align with questions pertaining to EU policy and polity, and constitute crucial
dimensions in the study of politicization (De Wilde and Zürn 2,102, p. 140). However,
congruence has also been studied with respect to distinct policy areas (for example
Lefkofridi and Casado‐Asensio, 2013; Vasilopoulou and Gattermann, 2013). It therefore
remains to be seen whether EU politicization has a differentiated effect on representation
that is conditional upon specific policy dimensions. Furthermore, EP elections are not the
only arena of EU politicization (for example Hutter and Grande, 2014; Kriesi, 2016;
Statham and Trenz, 2013). We thus recommend that researchers examine whether repre-
sentation at the national arena has been affected by increasing levels of politicization of
European issues, if at all (see Ares et al., 2017, for a focus on spill over effects). Examples
of such contestation include the recurring Eurozone crisis (for example Lobo and
Karremans, 2018) as well as the impact of the global health crisis resulting from
Covid‐19. In sum, we hope that our article inspires scholarship and sets an extensive
research agenda of conceptual and empirical questions that future work can address.
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